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Macedonia was divided into three parts, with the current Macedonia. The effects of the embargo on Serbia and state of Macedonia coming under Serbian rule. During World a Greek embargo on Macedonia are catastrophic.
War II, the Macedonian Republic was proclaimed a Because approximately 25% ofSkopje's wage earners constituent republic of Yugoslavia. An independent multihave not been paid in the past five months, major ethnic state since 1991, Macedonia has roughly 65% Slavic labor demonstrationa could occur this autumn.
Macedonians and 20 to 35% ethnic Albanian Muslims. The * A more aggressive policy of preventive Muslims' demographic growth rate is one of the highest in diplomacy with much greater EU participation is the world-almost 3.5% per year. needed,. i understand that it will pay a high price if it drives Kosovars 'esult has been a modified system of apartheid, with two south as refugees. cecond, if refugees do eventually arrive in societies sharing the same territory in a high state of tension Macedonia, the West must have a contingency plan already and in virtual isolation from each other.
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in place--coordinated not only with subregional actors Milosevic has been cautious due to the US battalion's Macedonia and Albania, but also with Greece, Turkey, and participation in UNPROFOR and the warnings sent by PresiBulgaria-and a strategy and well developed policies with the dents Bush and Clinton that civil war in Kosovo could lead broader North Atlantic Treaty allies. to US-Serbian confrontation. Though Milosevic has reined in
The most complex challenge is that the overall strategy Vojislav Seselj (Arkan) and other ultra-nationalist and the short-, mid-, and long-term policies must be paramilitary leadi.rs, he has recently tightened noncoordinated for both Macedonia and Kosovo. the region that lifting sanctions on Serbia completely without US observers indicate that current troop strength and defusing Kosovo could heighten tensions. Milosevic would feel armaments are adequate for the current mission. They do he had a freer hand and Kosovars would feel abandoned. fear mission creep and Americanization of the operation ifUS Some sanctions should remain linked to Kosovo as well as force levels are increased. They say the greatest risk to Bosnia. Second, renewed efforts to reinsert CSCE monitorAmerican forces is conflict stemming from activity along the into Kosovo could ease tensions and provide early warning border with Serb forces who are poorly trained, prior to a major incident. Third, the US should update its The US/UN deployments provide: (1) comfort for a contingency plans to deal with Serbia militarily should civil strained Macedonian government; (2) a line of demarcation conflict explode in Kosovo. where the border is uncertain; (3) an indication that the United States values an independent Macedonia; and (4) a (6) The Potential Refugee Problem.
No viable plans modest deterrent against Serbian incursions. Current US exist for managing Kosovar refugees. Yet it is those refugees force levels are adequate for the first three purposes, but who could trigger wider conflict. Macedonia would move them perhaps not the fourth. A stronger force with some local to the south for temporary housing, a move which would reinforcement capability would provide greater deterrence, surely cause a Greek response. Refugees would likely have to since it might delay the need to evacuate immediately.
be intercepted north of Skopje and diverted to temporary If the US decides to increase force levels, its forces camps in Albanian areas of Macedonia near Tetovo. should not exceed 50% of the total UN force, because that Additional steps would be needed to assure that the refugee would probably result in Americanization of the effort. The camps not become base camps for guerilla activity back in US should use its additional deployments to attract new Kosovo. This dangcr would require extensive planning, a deployments from EU countries. That would engage EU rapid reaction capability, and cooperation with Greece. countries more fully and send a clearer message to Greece Macedonia has not begun to think seriously about the and Serbia not to send troops into Macedonia.
unthinkable, but that roadblock must be overcome.
(2) US Diplomatic Relations with Macedonia. Skopje (7) Economic and Military Assistance to Macedonia. values US recognition and seeks full diplomatic relations.
$20 to $30 million in emergency economic assistance is The US could continue to use extension of diplomatic needed for Macedonia to provide additional petroleum and to relations to soften Skopje's position on the name and flag offset the cost of back wages for Skopje's underemployed. The issues. But the US should not wait too long to extend alternative is runaway inflation, since Skopje would print relations because Skopje desperately needs legitimacy. money to pay the salaries. Budget support for Skopje is Meanwhile, the US liaison office is understaffed; given the critical, given the twin embargoes it faces, so EU members importance of Macedonia, it should be enlarged.
should be encouraged to participate on an emergency basis. Macedonian armed forces include 15,000 troops and (3) Greek-Macedonian Relations. Beyond the flag and virtually no military equipment. All the tanks, fighter name issues, the Greeks are concerned about the influence aircraft and heavy artillery stationed in Macedonia before the Skopje might have on Macedonians li~ing in northern Greece.
breakup of Yugoslavia were taken to Serbia by the Yugoslav Skopje is unlikely tn drop "Macedonia" from its country's Army. US military advice would be welcome and would have name. After the October 16 elections, President Gligorov significant influence over the development of Macedonian conceivably could agree to a name change like the "Republic armed forces, but the number of advisors should be kept of Macedonia, Skopje" or "Vardar Macedonia." He might also small. Training for crowd control might pay high dividends. agree to modify the flag, which appears to be a lesser issue.
If the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia is lifted for In exchange, Gligorov would need more than a lifting of the Slovenia and Croatia, Macedonia should be made eligible for embargo, but possibly something less than full diplomatic military equipment. recognition by Greece. An agreement by Greece not to disrupt commerce and to accept Macedonian passports might be (8) Military Assistance to Albania. Albania's poorly enough. Increased EU pressure on Athens is needed in trained and equipped forces are deployed purely defensively. preparation for post-election negotiations.
Transfer of basic non-lethal equipment would gain support for US policies. The situation could be improved by setting up (4) East-West Road and Rail Links. Building road and a system in Germany to identify Excess Defense Articles rail links across Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Turkey appropriate for Albania. Providing a US defense advisor to would give Skopje an alternative to the North-South trade supplement our military-to-military contact group would routes, reduce the impact of the Serb/Greek sanctions, soften help. We should resist providing lethal equipment to Albania Greek positions on some issues, and give Macedonians for now, since it could easily end up in Kosovo.
